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The Biden-Putin Summit: An Unequal Burden

By
Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman

On Tuesday, May 25, the White House and the Kremlin announced that President Joe Biden will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 16 in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. side explained that the meeting is intended to “restore predictability and stability to the U.S.-Russia relationship.” If the summit proceeds as planned, it will come as bilateral relations slide towards new lows. Russian election interference in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, the death of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Open Skies Treaties, the SolarWinds hack, the Russian military buildup along the Ukrainian border and in the Arctic, continued disinformation operations, the poisoning and imprisonment of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, a state-led campaign to repress the opposition in Russia, Russia’s decision to label the U.S. as an “unfriendly” country, and the most recent developments—a phishing attack on human rights groups, nonprofit organizations, and think tanks and Russian support for a state-sponsored hijacking of a Ryanair flight to arrest prominent dissident Roman Protasevich in Belarus—all augur worsening relations between the United States and Russia.

Coming into this meeting, both sides are reaffirming their commitment to stability and security—if only at face value. But differing interpretations of this commitment establish significant barriers to meaningful negotiations. For instance, on the U.S. side, Biden’s declaration of “unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s ongoing aggression in the Donbas and Crimea” stands in diametric opposition to Russia’s stated and unstated goals in the so-called “Near Abroad.” Yet the Ukraine issue is only a single symptom of broader policy disagreements between both nations. At the heart of these disagreements, U.S. and Russian appeals to “sovereignty” are incompatible. The U.S. espouses its commitment to the defense of the Western liberal order, wherein sovereign states may opt in to the natural expansion of the corresponding norms and values. In contrast, Russia instrumentalizes sovereignty in the defense of traditional spheres of influence in a multipolar world. In the former, a “color revolution” manifests as the free expression of grassroots collective action, where civil society seeks to assert its right to self-determination. This often culminates in a pivot towards the Western liberal order and democracy. In the latter, a “color revolution” is necessarily a form of foreign intervention if it leads to a pivot away from the corresponding traditional sphere of influence.

This tense environment creates a range of possible outcomes for the Biden-Putin summit. The best-case scenario may be a shared declaration of values and joint commitment to de-escalation. A neutral outcome would likely be a summit where nothing is accomplished. The worst-case scenario would be negotiations that are counterproductive and serve to heighten tensions. In all of these scenarios, the Kremlin propaganda machine will spin the mere fact of the meeting as a concession. Putin would walk away with a victory, thereby bolstering his image as a strong leader who has maintained Russia’s great power status. Moreover, this would strengthen his domestic position ahead of State Duma elections in the fall. The only scenario where Putin is unlikely to emerge in an advantageous position would be a situation where the summit is canceled altogether.

Besides the domestic ramifications of this summit—primarily in Russia—other nations are watching the proceedings closely as well. Countries like Ukraine are concerned about the possibility that this summit will deny them a seat at the table, effectively creating another Yalta where great powers determine the fate of other nations and consign them to privileged spheres of influence.

From a practical standpoint, by agreeing to the summit, the Biden administration has placed the onus on itself to produce a favorable outcome; this is difficult to imagine given the divergent interests and values, as well as the lack of a substantive precoordinated agenda. Thus, even though Biden is certain to deliver a strong message in the summit, the strongest signal the U.S. can offer is to walk away. Otherwise, President Biden—no stranger to Vladimir Putin—will need to carefully navigate engagement with the Kremlin to bolster the notion that the U.S. is ready to oppose and respond to Russian transgressions, whether past, present, or future.